The year 2024 was a pivotal one in the trajectory of global transformation, witnessing major developments in the international system. Considering these developments, the Faculty of Economics and Political Science held a seminar to discuss the Arab Strategic Report, issued by the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in collaboration with the faculty, on Tuesday, April 29, 2025.

The seminar began with an opening session at 9:30 a.m., with welcoming remarks by Dr. Amany Masoud, Head of the Political Science Department at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science; Dr. Ayman Abdel Wahab, Director of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies; the Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science; and finally, the Vice Dean for Community Service and Environmental Development.

The first session of the seminar began at 10:00 a.m. and was titled: “The International System... Between American Centrality and the Shift of the Center of Gravity Toward East Asia.” It was chaired by Prof. Dr. Hassan Nafaa and featured Dr. Gamal Abdel Gawad, Dr. Raghda El Bahey, and Dr. Heidi Kars as speakers. The session concluded with some discussions between the speakers and attendees.

Prof. Dr. Hassan Nafaa began by thanking Dr. Amany Masoud for inviting him to the seminar, stressing the importance of discussing this report as a wake-up call due to its value to the faculty, the center, and what it offers researchers and students. He then outlined the topics presented in the report for discussion: firstly, the crisis of the decline of the liberal order established after World War II, which passed through several phases; secondly, the U.S. elections as a turning point and the implications of Trump’s re-election on American politics; thirdly, conflictual issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war; and fourthly, continental issues discussing matters such as the rise of the far-right in Europe.

Prof. Nafaa then handed the floor to Dr. Gamal Abdel Gawad, noting his expertise in international relations. Dr. Abdel Gawad spoke about the crisis of the international order, explaining that what he had learned from theories does not clearly explain current events, describing it as a “mismatch” or likening it to the theory of “black swans.” He emphasized that the key skill today is the ability to deduce and seek innovative solutions, with the main burden falling on the new generation. He argued that we should not impose rigid rules in political science but rather derive them and observe and explain what happens in our world. International relations as a discipline are rooted in the liberal order—a mix of liberal values and systems including individual freedom, free trade, abolition of slavery, etc.—which flourished after World War II and the Cold War and was revived with the U.S. and Britain’s inheritance of the Middle East and its division into states. Now, this order is under immense pressure in its ideological core in recent years, and its future is uncertain. This is evident in three dimensions: first, a shift in the power structure from Europe to China—the third-largest economy and largest industrial power with rapid technological advancement, which is no longer exclusive to the West. There is a transfer of power centers, a process of decline and rise. What's new is that this transfer from Western power to another power raises the question: are we moving toward a globalization of multiple blocs or a multipolar world? There has also been a development in the fluidity of money, goods, people, and ideas—something the world witnessed with clear cooperation after the Cold War. There has been a shift from cooperative to conflictual relations (more trade-related now—customs tariffs). Human rights, democracy, and liberal principles no longer dominate the scene, especially with the rise of the far-right across the West, leading to a change in ideological character. But where will this situation take us? Most likely, to complete instability.

Next, Dr. Raghda El Bahey spoke, explaining that the Arab Strategic Report is a distinguished and precise document that offers accurate monitoring and analysis of global events at the international, regional, and even national (Egyptian) levels throughout 2024, with clear trends on which the future can be anticipated. She began by discussing the shift of civilizational precedence toward East Asia, noting that its roots go back to the late 20th century with the emergence of the concept of the Asian Century. This concept was built on several facts, including economic rise and engines of labor, production, and innovation in China, followed by India. The strength of the Asian continent lies in its economy. It’s not just about a shift in civilizational primacy to the East, but about economic factors. Politically, the Asian continent has a complex and non-homogeneous political environment, ranging from democracies in Japan and South Korea to authoritarian regimes in neighboring countries facing real challenges in poverty and social inequality. Thus, she argued, there is more than one Asian Century. Asia is undergoing demographic and economic transformations that could hinder its role, such as a declining labor force due to aging populations, leading to increasing pressure on social security systems. In contrast, Asia also faces security and geopolitical challenges, notably tensions in the South China Sea and the potential conflict between China and Taiwan, which could reshape strategic balances on the continent. Despite the rise of major powers like India and Brazil, and partial emergence of Africa, complete Asian dominance remains questionable. The international system is not heading toward Asian unipolarity but rather toward multipolarity, where powers like Western Europe and the U.S. continue to maintain leadership roles politically, economically, and militarily.

There is ongoing debate about whether the liberal international order is in its death throes or merely facing a temporary crisis from which it can recover. It still enjoys strong institutional roots, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in addition to its cultural component manifested in globalization and American cultural dominance—something Asian powers have yet to offer a complete alternative to. She concluded her remarks by stating that the international system is in a state of intellectual and analytical fluidity. It is possible to infer the continuation of American hegemony just as it is possible to infer its decline. On one hand, the U.S. still possesses the world’s most powerful military and greatest cultural influence. On the other, signs of its retreat are evident—foreign conflicts, growing isolationist tendencies domestically, and discussions about the end of the American century. The world stands at a crossroads between East and West, where the features of a new international system are taking shape. Wars such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict or a potential China-Taiwan confrontation may accelerate this transformation. However, the shape of this system, its number of poles, and the time of its full emergence remain unclear.

Dr. Heidi Kars then took the floor, affirming the significant value of the strategic report, which represents a qualitative addition to the Arab library as it comprehensively monitors international, regional, and local interactions. She focused her intervention on three main axes within the chapter on international interactions. First, systemic transformations in the international order: she discussed ongoing structural shifts in the global system, noting that the world is going through a transitional phase marked by instability and uncertainty. The system is no longer clearly bipolar nor definitively multipolar, and there is an erosion of the foundations upon which Western hegemony was built. Although rising powers, especially China, were previously seen as the main challenge, the paradox now lies in the fact that the biggest threat to the liberal order may come from within itself—specifically from within the United States due to internal economic and political changes.

Second, the impact of transformation on the Global South: Dr. Kars questioned whether the Global South is merely a recipient of these changes or if it plays an active role. She used Africa as an example, noting the intense international competition over the continent from major powers such as China and Russia, as well as regional powers like Turkey and the Gulf states. Despite this, some African countries have begun to play flexible and negotiated roles, such as diversifying international partnerships and avoiding dependence on a single actor.

Third, epistemological structuring in the field of international relations: she pointed out the centrality of Western thought in the discipline of international relations, where Western—particularly American and European—theorizing dominates the field. However, there have been attempts by researchers from the Global South to present theoretical alternatives that move away from Western centrism and address real issues that traditional Western literature cannot adequately tackle. This is sometimes referred to as the movement of decolonizing global knowledge in international relations.

Dr. Kars concluded her remarks by referring to a report from The Economist magazine stating that the Israeli army is using artificial intelligence systems to identify its targets in Gaza by analyzing vast datasets, including communications, satellite imagery, suspicious activities, and technologies based on facial and voice recognition. Despite their apparent precision, these technologies rely on inputs that may be inaccurate, explaining the large number of civilian casualties. There is growing concern that this method may become a new “trend” in future wars. This point is essential to understanding how modern technology has transformed the nature of warfare in Gaza and should have been included under the section on "technological and military developments."

At the end of this fruitful session, Prof. Dr. Hassan Nafaa concluded by speaking about the most prominent issues discussed in the annual strategic report, notably the rapid collapse of international institutions established after World War II, which had formed the foundation of the system of international justice and legitimacy—such as the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court. The moral and legal role that Western powers had claimed, particularly in protecting human rights, has regressed, as these values have either been targeted or neglected in practical reality. This erosion in the performance of institutions raises fundamental questions about the future of the international system: Is it still possible to reform the United Nations system, especially the Security Council, despite its rigidity and inability to adapt to the new balance of power? Or does reality dictate the need to consider the establishment of an alternative global order—something that usually only happens after major shocks like world wars?

 Following this, the second session began under the title “The Regional System… Shrinking Axis of Resistance and Disruption in Normalization Calculations,” chaired by and with speakers Dr. Moataz Salama, Prof. Dr. Nevine Mosaad, Dr. Mohamed El-Sayed Idris, and Dr. Ali Galal Maouad. Dr. Moataz Salama began by thanking and welcoming his colleagues and Prof. Dr. Ahmed Youssef. He then discussed the Arab and Middle Eastern systems and the interactions between them, focusing on developments in 2024. He pointed out that the “Arab” section of the report covered numerous issues, but the topic of the “Axis of Resistance and the Disruption of Normalization Calculations” was chosen as the focus, without limiting or diminishing the importance of other topics.

The Arab system was divided into three parts. The first part addressed issues of the Arab system, most notably: from the “Al-Aqsa Flood” to the “Northern Flood,” indicating the symbolic beginning and end of a pivotal year in the region. It also analyzed the reality of chronic Arab crises that have become a stable deadlock without full settlements—such as in Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and Lebanon—posing a threat to national unity.

The second part focused on the transformation of rules of engagement, highlighting the increasing Israeli violence in Gaza, excessive deterrent force, and the long war, along with the confusion in decision-making processes within Israel and the absence of a cohesive collective mindset. The report also discussed the decline of non-state groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, raising questions about whether this decline is tactical or a strategic fading. It reviewed the Lebanese scene from limited engagement to open war.

The third part of the report tackled the internal Israeli conflicts, noting that all parties are competing from a right-wing platform, reflecting the narrowness of the political spectrum there. It also discussed Hamas’ position in power despite the war and its public conflict with the Palestinian Authority, raising questions about the reality of joint Palestinian action.

The Arab section concluded by analyzing the Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ positions on normalization, highlighting the divergence among Gulf stances and the national calculation differences between them, and the upcoming Arab Summit’s internal divisions. It raised the question of how topics and solutions to Arab regional conflicts can be presented amid ambiguous Arab roles and a dysfunctional Arab state.

Prof. Dr. Nevine Mosaad then spoke, focusing on several observations. First, despite the report’s importance and courage in addressing thorny issues, its language and terminology are difficult—especially for those outside the academic field. Second, she objected to excluding the Hamas/Israel model from examples of asymmetric wars and rejected the idea that Israeli strikes and spatial control undermine decentralization. She considered that what happened does not contradict the evolution of asymmetric warfare but rather reflects a shift in Israeli strategy from spatial confrontation to targeting the idea and spirit.

Third, she discussed the term “parallel non-state actors,” calling for clarification of the difference between this and “armed actors.” She gave the example of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as an unarmed actor yet a central political player, as well as governments that run the state during times of political weakness.

Fourth, she rejected the idea that Iran is retreating from its regional project, considering that the imperial nature of Iran’s project does not allow for inward withdrawal; rather, it is a long-term, trans-political-systems project.

Fifth, she addressed the issue of proxy wars, noting that the report’s analysis of the Houthis’ evolution from a tool to a central actor requires understanding the actor’s own motivation development, especially as they moved from a tool to a representative of a popular sector.

Lastly, she emphasized the importance of analyzing the performance of the official Arab system, especially in central issues such as Palestine and Syria, pointing to weak outcomes despite official statements.

Then Dr. Mohamed El-Sayed Idris spoke about the Arab and Middle Eastern systems and their interactions, and the developments of 2024. He referred to the G20 Summit in Mumbai, where a new Middle East project was proposed, followed by the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” which proved the Palestinian people’s ability to resist, toppling Zionist ideology and the West as a whole. Despite this, the Arab system did not stand with the Palestinian cause; some countries fund the Zionist entity, others are helpless, while the Palestinian people endured for several months.

These developments revealed the Axis of Resistance extending from Iran to Hezbollah and Yemen, creating an imbalance in power. This coincided with severe strikes against Hezbollah and the emergence of ISIS in Syria under American-agenda motives (noting that Syria in the past refused to betray Hezbollah or normalize with Israel).

He mentioned the previously ambiguous Turkish role, which has found strength in Syria amid increasing Israeli power. We are now during dangerous developments, accompanied by many questions about the Arab system’s stance if a war breaks out between Iran and Israel over the nuclear issue. Considering these ambiguous Arab roles, settlements appear to be halfway measures.

The session concluded with Dr. Ali Galal Maouad, who explained the challenges researchers face in this context, citing a previous experience related to Turkey to emphasize the difficulty of keeping pace with these changes.

The report addresses Turkey’s notable presence across different axes, pointing to its political, economic, and military roles in several regional issues such as Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, and Palestine, with notes on the potential to focus more on files like Somalia.

The report highlights the dual image of Turkey’s roles—positive as a cooperative actor and negative as a source of threat—while pointing to possible contradictions due to the multiple contributors to the report. Dr. Galal reflected on the nature of this divergence, attributing it to the weakness of the Arab system, the fluidity of regional interactions, and the differing national interests among Arab countries, alongside the increasing and continuing debate over Turkey’s role.