When one examines the two main traditions in the analysis of power in organization analysis they bear evident, and opposite, historical traces. First, in conventional organization theory (as argued in Hardy and Clegg, 1996) the emphasis has been very much on power as an aspect of informal and illegitimate organization, a tendency that achieves its strongest expression in Mintzberg (1983). In this tradition power employs illegitimate resources to coerce others into the attainment of illegitimate ends by the exercisers of power; in contrast, where there is legitimacy there is authority. The reasons for this treatment go back to Parsons's and Henderson's translation of Weber (1948), where Herrschaft (literally ‘domination’) was always translated as authority. Supporting this tendency towards overemphasizing legitimacy, one may recall March and Simon's (1958) notion of organization membership being the result of a balance of ‘inducements’ offered by the organization that are accepted as legitimate by the member. In this formula, membership carries the obligation to accept the legitimacy of the ‘contribution’ required. To join an organization is thus to accept its legitimacy at the outset. Hence, in these orthodox traditions that constituted the contemporary sociology of organizations, the legitimacy of hierarchical structures of imperative coordination was established by definitional fiat. Thus, power was by definition illegitimate and coercive – in the familiar way of power being the capacity to get others to do what they would not otherwise do. Later, in both resource dependency and strategic contingencies theory (Clegg and Rura-Polley, 1998), it was also quite natural to stress the legitimacy of authority. Consequently, power as a variant from authority was already predefined as more or less implicitly illegitimate, being dependent upon members having control of some strategic resources outside of the imperatives of formal authority. The most famous articulation of this is Crozier's (1963) account of the maintenance workers in a French tobacco monopoly.

From the reception of Braverman (1974) into labor process theory, an opposite set of assumptions came to predominate. Here the assumption was that any structure of imperative coordination would always be exploitative. Hence, resistance to it, rather than its acceptance as legitimate authority, would be normal. The concept of real interests was central to this debate. It was expressed in the following terms: capitalists control the labor process in the interest of exploitation; proletarians resist this exploitation in defense of their essential interest in autonomy. The ‘romance’ of labor that informed this position derived from Marx and Engels's (1970) ‘German Ideology’, and its celebration of craft labor, a position that spoke directly to Braverman's biography.

In the ‘labor process debate’ in British sociology the crucial criticism of Braverman (1974) came to be that he had neglected resistance and overstated power as control (Littler and Salaman, 1982); meanwhile, ever more subtle forms of resistance were identified (Clegg, 1994). In these, people asserted their interests against structures of labor process control based on an objective interest in ‘exploitation’. Sometimes the category of resistance became broad enough to accommodate almost any kind of ‘escape attempt’ from everyday organizational life. In the post-Braverman debates, resistance was only to be expected and should be seen as legitimate as well as justified. In the labor process literature there is an overstatement of the concept of resistance that parallels, exactly, the overstatement of legitimacy in the more orthodox literature. What is required is a theoretical framework that seeks to understand the dynamics of legitimate power and resistance not as necessary but as contingent and conditional.

Any political theory of power, to be adequate, requires an organization analysis to bridge the gap between the sovereign subject and the sovereign state (see Flyvberg, 1998 for a case in point). Each of these sovereign sites has been occasion for an overdetermining liberalism and an overdetermining structuralism, respectively. Neither leaves much space for the organizational. Equally, organization theories not embedded in social theory are at risk of being impoverished. Important debates will simply pass them by: there needs to be a reciprocal enrichment of organization and political theories. The non-recognition by the majority of orthodox contributions (with significant exceptions such as Walsh et al., 1981) of social theoretical work developed from Lukes (1974) onwards is an unfortunate sign of the selective inattention that has bred this situation. Not only Lukes's but also Foucault's contributions to the power debate have largely gone unrecorded.
Foucault (1977) increasingly became enlisted to the labor process debate in which the chief criticism was that Braverman (1974) had neglected resistance (Littler and Salaman, 1982). Foucault (1977), it seemed, held the key to a more appropriate understanding of resistance in the labor process (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993) through stressing power as always exercised on free bodies whose vitalism gave rise to resistance.

Radical Dimensions

Steven Lukes's (1974) Power: A Radical View argued that power not only operates through one person or agency getting another to do something that they would not otherwise do but also by structuring the thoughts of the other, the concepts and categories they use, so that they already think through dominated terms. This radical view of power played out through the concept of hegemony, a key term of Western Marxism (Gramsci, 1971). Initially, hegemony was conceptualized as a form of control or rule through the contents of knowledge, especially popular culture. The concept of hegemony as a form of power that operated on and through the consciousness of the oppressed, such that they were unaware of their oppression, became less stable as debate developed in the 1980s. It was Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) work, in particular, that did most to deconstruct, and reconstruct, the concept – in a manner that, as Geras (1987; 1988) noted, required renovation of the Western Marxist frame that had housed hegemony. The new design proposed by Laclau and Mouffe owed a great deal, implicitly, to the work of Foucault (1977).

From ‘Real Interests’ to ‘Post-Structuralism’

Some time after Lukes's (1974) work was published the concept of hegemony came under sustained revision, most notably in the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985), in a reversal of the dominant interpretation of Gramsci's (1971) themes. While hitherto the focus had been on the content of ideas as a characteristic of hegemony, they proposed instead that emphasis should be on the form. Their argument was that hegemony reigns wherever there is discursive fixity, clarity in assembly and ascription, floating signifiers rather than fixed ones that are pinned down, ordering the form of debate, irrespective of the content.

Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) ideas were related to the themes of what was known, theoretically, as post-structuralism. Lukes, with his layered dimensions of power, was clearly using a structural frame where at root was a conception of power thought of in terms of a characteristic model of random mechanical intervention – one that had marked mainstream power debates since Hobbes (Clegg, 1989; Hindess, 1996). In post-structuralism new terms and approaches were developing that stood in marked contrast to classical mechanical conceptions of power as a causal relation. Chief amongst these was the notion of discourse.

Behind Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) endorsement of post-structuralism were some big implications. At the core of both recent post-structuralist debates and the classical conception of the relation between consciousness and interests is some conception of a significant relation between power and language. In classical socialism, and radical views of power, the relation was always one of masking, of appearances, of falsehood – one in which language distorted or misrepresented reality. Hence derived the centrality of vocabularies of ‘false consciousness’.

In post-structuralism the relationship of language to consciousness is not one of falsehood. Reality cannot be assumed to be known unequivocally: it can be known only through its representation in language, as the horizon of its being; hence language cannot mask anything, as it is depicted as doing in traditional concepts of ideology and hegemony. What it can do is to represent possibilities and position possibilities in relation to each other. In the broadest terms, language defines the possibilities of meaningful existence at the same time as it limits them. Language constitutes our sense of ourselves as a distinct subjectivity. Subjectivity is constituted through myriad ‘discursive practices’ of talk, text, writing, cognition and argumentation, of representation generally. The meanings of and membership within the categories of discursive practice become a constant site of struggle over power. Forging individuality is the expression of an active process.

Post-structuralism admits of no rational unified subject as the locus or source of the expression of identity. Identity is contingent, provisional, achieved rather than given. Identity is always in process, as always subject to reproduction or transformation through discursive practices that secure or refuse particular posited identities. Identities are not absolute but are always relational. Difference defines identity, rather than its
being something intrinsic to a particular person or category of experience, such as worker, wife, woman or whore. Each of these is a possible signifier of self, carrying complex, shifting and frequently ambiguous and contradictory meaning. Foucault (1977) sketches some of the identity-shaping disciplines that have been constituted through practices of power and knowledge. Knowledge used to structure and fix representations in historical forms is thus the accomplishment of power. Following on from Foucault, in a move reminiscent of the Frankfurt school of critical theory (albeit expressed through elements of post-structuralism), Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argue that hegemonic power exists neither in specific individuals (as in Lukes) nor in concrete practices (as in Foucault). Instead, they would locate hegemony in the way in which agents and practices articulate in a particular fixed ensemble of representations. No fixed, real, hidden or excluded term or dimension exists except in its representation. To the extent that meanings become fixed or reified on certain forms, and these then articulate particular practices, agents and relations, then this fixity is what achieves hegemonic power. Power is the apparent order of taken-for-granted categories of existence fixed and represented in a myriad discursive forms and practices. Power is neither ethical nor micro-political: above all it is textual, semiotic, inherent in the very possibility of textuality, meaning and signification in the social world. The central feature of power consists in this fixing of the terrain for its own expression.

Within postmodern discourse there are no ‘real’ interests with the potential to function as a holy grail for analysis. Claims to know the real interests of any group, other than through techniques of representation that one uses to assert them, do not survive the post-structural reconceptualization of power. The demise of certain types of essentialist conceptualization of real, but unrealized, interests signifies a decline of ‘class politics’ and leads to calls for a new politics. One of these calls is for a greater transparency, for a politics attuned to ‘real’ bases of moral life such as religion, gender and the ecology. Parties and movements may be able to present themselves as advocates of more or less unequivocal and neglected ‘goods’. The most salient of these will be, in ascending order of abstraction and consequent inverse simplification: the politics of one earth, one body, one nation and one institution. These correspond to the interests of the ecology, to the interests of women, to the interests of communitarian aspirations to statehood inscribed on the basis of whatever markers of difference – be they cultural, linguistic or ethnic – and the subordination of all interests to those that find expression through the market. It should be clear that reduction of politics to single-issue moralities does not present a very flexible basis for actual conduct, with all of its specific complexities, fudges and ambiguity, however appealing it is as a ground for the pronouncement of moral judgments. Note an absence from this list. Today, in the advanced societies, no party would seem to want to take on the role of defending the state. Some commentators conclude from this a requirement for a more encompassing theory of citizenship to reflect postmodern times (Barbalet, 1987; Roche, 1992). The globalization of capitalist economics and culture (Robertson, 1992) transforms the nature of citizenship in relation to sovereignty and the nation-state (Mann, 1986; Rose and Miller, 1992). The socialist project, in its various Marxist forms, was one that made sense only within a restricted conception of the relation between the state and the economy. States were sovereign; economies were not. Global institutions have transformed that relation: while it is evident that some states retain more sovereign powers than others do, the basic calibration that framed the earlier assumptions has shifted. National economic space is no longer the sole project of sovereign national subjects.

Resistance

Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe all write from a tradition of Nietzschean-influenced ‘social theory’. Foucault's work around the time of Discipline and Punish (1977) not only placed a relational and strategic conception of power in central focus but also did much to promote the idea that wherever power was to be found one would also find resistance,

Resistance may be defined as the ‘efficacious influence of those subordinate to power’ (Barbalet, 1985: 542). In Foucault, power and resistance seemed almost inescapably and dialectically linked. In part, it was the notion of an inherent opposition existing naturally against power that has allowed Foucault's ideas, especially on surveillance and resistance to it, to be absorbed, relatively seamlessly, into contemporary labor process debates (see, for example, Sewell and Wilkinson, 1992). Power and resistance stand in a specific relationship to each other (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1993), where one rarely has one without the other.

Late in his life Foucault proposed that the relations between the organized and those organizing might
be better captured through the concept of government rather than through the concept of resistance (van Krieken, 1996). Foucault means both the strategies of organizational governance, in a broad sense, as well as those of self-governance by those who are subjects and objects of organizational governance. The point of Foucault's argument is not to refer to two different 'levels' – organizational and individual – of government but to capture what is said to be novel about liberal forms of governance, namely that the two levels get linked together. The concept of government has some advantages for organization theorists. It does not presume a priori that organizations are always legitimate or, conversely, that they will always be characterized by resistance. The focus is on the constitution of both legitimacy and resistance.

Foucault saw both kinds of governance (legitimacy and resistance) as presupposing the basis of free human agency: an agency whose freedom is always circumscribed within what is known. What is known includes not only that which is known differentially, and with differential value attached to it, but also that which is known in common, often as a result of its translation by experts of various kinds, into what, after Haugaard (1997a), one can address as 'practical consciousness'. The effects of practical consciousness need not necessarily be seen as purposively achieved projects. 'We do not live in a governed world so much as a world traversed by the “will to govern”, fuelled by the constant registration of “failure”, the discrepancy between ambition and outcome, and the constant injunction to do better next time' (Rose and Miller, 1992: 191). Much of the power of this government resides in the remorseless project it unleashes on those subjected to it – both those managing and those managed.

Government refers to the projects of the organizational elites in seeking to align the interests of organization members. But there are also these other subjects to consider. Van Krieken (1996) coins the term ‘protogovernmentalization’ to address the process by which the initiatives, projects and strategies of individuals and groups become mutually aligned and coordinated with those of elites – the process through which existing forms of government are addressed by the governed. Such a focus involves the many small ways in which the personal projects of ordinary people become aligned with authoritative images of the social order, not always in their support, but sometimes in their transformation.

What is crucial to both the concepts of government and protogovernmentalization is what people know. The power/knowledge relation is thus central to the relations of power. A concrete example may make this clearer. Protogovernmentalization in a transforming mode is rarely as evident as it was during the week of 31 August to 6 September 1997, between the death and the funeral of the Princess of Wales. In Britain in this space the celebration of the ‘People’s Princess’ as a ‘Queen of Hearts’ became a popular, if not universal, movement. However, it was one born of no single purposive project. It arose from the awful randomness with which circuits of celebrity became entangled in a twisted heap of armored metal and broken bodies, shattered dreams and ruptured wish fulfillment, disrupted tales and unscripted stories. From this contingency grew a popular power that resisted so many circuits of governmental power, programmed by constitutional monarchy, that, while it presaged no dramatic or revolutionary institutional upheaval, seemed to transform the popular perception of the House and Family of Windsor. It would be inappropriate to term the grief and sense of loss that achieved this as ‘resistance’. The movement was born out of a collective experience of personal loss of someone known intimately through the texts of everyday life that celebrity, drama and virtuality provide. There was an intimacy experienced through narrative traditions of love and death, of betrayal and bereavement, of sisterhood and motherhood, that most could identify with. Sovereign majesty, with so many circuits of power at its disposal, was powerless to control or channel the responses these events unleashed. In the face of a motherless child, a grieving family, and a people stripped of their dreaming, their stories, their grace, momentarily united in a culture of loss, something happened to rewrite the scripts of governance and legitimacy. Waves of applause swept through the Cathedral from the masses outside as the brother of the dead princess spoke. The extraordinariness of the events of that week signals their sociological rarity, however.

Power, Resistance and Government

Given the continuing centrality of the power/knowledge nexus through Foucault's work it would seem that a conception of knowledge would be the most promising fulcrum around which to articulate the relation of power, resistance and government. Government and resistance work on and through knowledge and the forms of social relations that embed and constitute such knowledge. The forms of social relations can be
conceived of in terms of an ever-widening circle from self through significant others, to solidaristic others, to generalized others, to adopt terminology from symbolic interaction. Each of these may be thought of as constitutive of aspects of the identity of the subject. One can identify at least four 'subject positions' that differ precisely in terms of the extensiveness of organization.

The most intensive is self-organization: the acquisition of more or less disciplined and coherent self-capacities. How coherently organized is the individual, in terms of subjectivity, as a reflexive agent in power relations? How coherently organized is the individual as one who seeks to enrol, translate, interest or oppose others in projects? Does the individual subject have sufficient self-cognizance to be able to exercise this agency?

Second is social organization that implicates significant others, usually known in and through face-to-face relations. To what extent is the subject able to draw upon resources of social organization greater than the self, such as familial networks or ecologies of local community networks?

Third is solidaristic organization, involving the more extensive organization of others known only at a distance. To what extent can the subject draw upon the consciously organized resources of a social movement or collective organization in the pursuit of their agency? To what extent does power constitute the resources of human agency in terms of self, and significant and generalized others?

Fourth, there is generalized organization, involving the organizational capacities of generalized agencies, known only remotely and virtually, through their representations rather than mediated in terms of their representatives. To what extent is subject relevance enrolled into the organizational resources of pre-existing agencies, such as media organizations? The agendas of generalized organizations, such as media organizations, might interconnect with the circuits of power that one seeks to construct. Such generalized organizations have capacities to plug into one's circuitry, if they so choose, and one may seek to enrol them to one's cause. Does the subject articulate a story that connects with specific ‘news values’ as reporters and their editors constitute them, for instance?

Following Laclau and Mouffe (1985), one may note that knowledge also has formal relations, irrespective of its content. The appropriate dimension for conceptualizing the formal qualities of knowledge is that of its framing. Knowledge may be more or less socially framed. At the most, it will be codified knowledge. Codified knowledge, such as a system of scientific propositions or of rational law, is highly abstract and thus translates across contexts easily. At the furthest remove from this is private knowledge, where what is known is not shared at all in the public sphere. For all intents and purposes it does not exist discursively (Wittgenstein, 1968). Mediating that which is most framed, through codification, and that which is not known at all (because it is not in the public sphere), is knowledge that is only imperfectly socially framed for translatability: it may be highly situationally embedded, for instance. Thinking of the matter in this way yields a table (with the residual category of non-public, or private, knowledge) where government will proceed through one or other of several major rationalities (see Table 3.1).

### Table 3.1 Rationalities of government: social framing of available knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject constitution</th>
<th>More framed</th>
<th>Less framed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Reflexive self-organization</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant others</td>
<td>Cultural organization</td>
<td>Confusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidaristic others</td>
<td>Coordinated actions</td>
<td>Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized others</td>
<td>Available relevancy</td>
<td>Irrelevancy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Organizations exist in and around power relations among people who have differential subjectivity, different identities. Different identities and the subjectivity that they make relevant can be postulated as offering differential resources for accommodating to or resisting organizational power relations. Within organizations an elite typically seeks compliance through the accommodation of others to their will, perhaps imperatively,
more usually perhaps governmentally. Yet, power does not routinely produce consent (although some
tendencies that always relate power with authority, such as Parsons, 1963, assume that it does).

Any codification of the types of resistant consciousness must testify to a remarkable ingenuity and creativity.
What is crucial is consciousness: without it no resistance is possible. However, the consciousness in question
may be in the subjectivity of either A or B, or even in the intersubjectivity that connects them. Hence, it is
necessary, first, to discuss those strategies of outflanking that can render resistance redundant. (Mann, 1986
is the source for the notion of ‘organizational outflanking’.) That is not to say that, empirically, outflanking
will always precede resistance and that resistance will have to unfetter whatever the chains of outflanking
are, but it is to acknowledge that resistance requires consciousness. Whether the consciousness is that of
A or B, or shared intersubjectively, makes a difference. When the actions being constituted as resistance
by B are unknown to A then A will be unlikely to seek to outflank the resistance that is offered. However,
where B is unaware that the action engaged in is constituted as resistance by A it matters little: A is still
able to mount a campaign of outflanking against B, even despite B’s lack of knowledge of what is occurring.
Hence, the problematic of the third dimension of power, focused on the ‘unconsciousness’ of B, is analytically
prior. Before B is resistant, consciousness must exist in either A or B; outflanking, however, requires, at
the minimum, consciousness by A. In terms of Lukes’s problematic we require an understanding of how a
consciousness of power is possible by B before we are able to discuss resistance. Thus, resistance as a form
of power will first be explained in its absence, or at least its minimization, before considering its presence and
those conditions conducive to its amplification.

The presentation is ideal typical; in reality one would expect that the social framing of available knowledge
would have more of a variable rather than a binary character, but this presentation is intended for illustrative
purposes only. In future research applications, one would anticipate that the ideal typical model might be used
as a tool for generating likely hypotheses for the analysis of power, legitimacy and resistance. Resistance
would be lower, one would hypothesize, the less framed the subject constitution. The legitimacy of resistance
would be higher the more framed the subject constitution. The overall conditions for organization legitimacy
would require empirical research to be specified in particular cases. Generally, we may note that it is difficult to
address issues of organization legitimacy purely from the elite side: that is why recourse to ‘strong’ corporate
culture is an insufficient basis for legitimacy. Legitimacy, in organization terms, depends on the variety and
difference of subject positions that it seeks to organize, as well as the degree of organization of the subject
constitution of these.

**Reflexive Self-Organization/Isolation**

Where the individual actor exists under conditions of less framed knowledge, their reflexivity will be limited.
For instance, at the individual level, one may simply not know or understand how power relations constitute
one’s own identity. Many ‘coming out’ accounts of the experience of sexual liberation from the assumptions
of ‘normal’ heterosexuality often have the character of an individual overcoming his or her isolation. Such
isolation is due to a lack of reflexivity about the possibilities of one’s self. Subjects simply were isolated from
the possibilities of sexual identity other than the one dimension proffered as ‘normal’, in the confines of the
family, the small town, or whatever conditions had to be breached so that other forms of identity could be
seen and resistance to ‘normalcy’ organized. Isolation contributes to resistance to change at the same time
that it facilitates the acceptance of the established order. Isolation is a factor that can facilitate or restrict the
imposition of a specific kind of power from one subject to others. It depends on the context.

Any act of resistance requires some degree of framed knowledge. At the very minimum it requires reflexive
self-organization of one’s self as a ‘resistant subject’. To be a resistant subject is to be someone who knows
enough about who he or she is and what he or she could, and should be, that one chooses to make a stand.
One does that even if that stand is a seemingly idiosyncratic act of outrage or rebellion, or an existential
gesture. Some cinematic examples are useful: the minor act of vandalism that landed the eponymous hero
in Cool Hand Luke (directed by Stuart Rosenberg, 1967) in jail; McMurphy’s attempt to watch the World
Series ball game in One Flew Over The Cuckoo’s Nest (directed by Milos Forman in 1975). In the latter
Nurse Ratchett exercised classic non-decision-making power. Yet, this kind of personal resistance, the first
step against the defeat of any tyranny, hegemony or regime of normalcy, is the most vulnerable to defeat. At
the very simplest, snuff out the person (or in McMurphy’s case lobotomize him) and one might also defeat
resistance. Courage, conviction and a consciousness that is reflexively self-organized are no guarantee of success. However, they are a more probable basis for it than the isolation in which people exist in the absence of that reflexive self-organization such as characterized the inmates of the institution before the arrival of McMurphy. At the level of individual organization one might experience as a situational snub, slight or handicap a form of power whose systemic quality remains obscure because one lacks or has not yet developed the reflexive capacities to organize oneself coherently across the multiple scenes of one's individual life. One lacks a coherent framing account of oneself and sees as particular misfortunes what others might see as systematic oppression, varying only in its locales.

**Cultural Organization/Confusion**

The individual's self-organization constructs divided life worlds in which one manages the trials and tribulations of relative powerlessness in one sphere by hermetically sealing experience in situational specificity. Subject compartmentalization into segmented and thus psychologically protected spheres may be seen as a form of resistance in itself, as witness the 'instrumental' worker (Goldthorpe et al., 1969). Time and space may be ordered and arranged to minimize the possibilities for networks of kin or kith, or other social organization, emerging. Complex divisions of labor, anti-union prohibitions and the extreme experience of competition are examples. Other, more macro-historical examples include the use of armies from elsewhere for the business of intra-imperial subordination, a strategy that has a long history, reaching to Tiananmen Square in recent times.

Where one might anticipate solidaristic organization, time and space can be ordered and arranged to minimize the interaction and mutual awareness of subordinates, or even to render one group of subordinates invisible to another (Barnes, 1998: 101). Division can affect the stories that the subjects of power want to tell: what may be a complex of ethnic or organizational politics plays in the media as a story that focuses only on the dramatic soundbites, or dramatic television footage. An example of the role that division can play in the outflanking of potential resistance occurs in the example that Collinson (1994) cites of the multinational corporation, where division into separate profit centers reinforces ‘insecurities and barriers to resistance’. Solidaristic organization in multinational corporations always suffers from the potential risk of isolation. (In fact, isolation and division are, as it were, two sides of the same coin.) One might achieve solidaristic organization and a successful strike in one country against an employing organization that is a multinational. Yet, one is relatively powerless where the multinational can isolate and substitute for that national production with an increase from elsewhere outside the national basis of solidarism, where competing national solidarisms come into play. Coordination across the boundaries of division can provide a basis for resistance, but one that is much harder to achieve than the power that it resists. The latter is, ostensibly, a relatively unified and highly strategic locus of organizational calculation, while the resistance is much more fragmented, lacks centralization, and does not share a quantifiable strategic objective. Government can involve not only the self but also significant others whose support can nourish and sustain individually resistant self-consciousness through the building and sharing of a common culture. Where it is possible to marshal significant others, such as are provided by a family or kin network or an informal social organization within one that is formal, this will be the case. Hence, resistance, like the practice of democracy (Pateman, 1970), can thrive on its experience, at least where knowledge is more framed.

Where government is less framed, where few symbols or other signs cohere, then solidaristic organization invariably will founder on confusion. Those who are somewhat powerless remain so because they are confused or unaware of the social organization of power, of informal conduits as well as formal protocols, the style and substance of power, its shared culture embedded in a distinct social organization. It is not that they do not have a precise understanding of the rules of the game so much as that they might not recognize what game is in play, let alone know the rules. They may well be playing another game altogether. Of course, this is a particular problem where an overwhelmingly technologically superior form of life meets one that is by contrast less developed in technical terms. Historically the vast majority of cross-cultural contact has occurred on this basis: consequently it has been the force of arms that has settled the outcomes. In this context resistance usually occurs through a clash of strongly held cultural systems.

**Coordinated Actions/Division**

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An interesting contrast between recourse to more and less framed bodies of knowledge is available by contrasting two seemingly similar ‘total institutions’ (Goffman, 1961) – prisoner of war camps and concentration death camps. In either, at the individual level, existential resistance by individuals is always possible, where the sense of self remains intact through techniques of ‘mental distancing’. At the existential extreme, individual acts of resistance, including the defiance explicit in one's own suicide, are always possible. Yet, resistance through solidaristic organization is much more difficult in the circumstances of the concentration camp than in the prisoner of war camp. Existing in severe deprivation under a regime of brutality, terror and horror is not conducive to closely organized ranks of relatively undisciplined individuals. The aggregate impact of individual acts of resistance may be effective but it is easy for the individual will to power to be broken, by death, if necessary. Without organization, resistance will not survive the individuals’ death. In addition, disparate acts of recalcitrance by people exposed to certain terror if the uncertain enterprise of resistance is exposed make the achievement of collective organized resistance more fragile and precarious a probability. While little or no chance of organizing for success may exist, probabilities suggest that the attempt at organization will lead to certain failure and death. Even if breaching the confines of the camp is successful one may be picked out as part of the fleeing mob of inmates at the leisure of the authorities that command the environs of the camp. For these reasons opportunism will always be a problem. Few may be willing to sacrifice themselves for the altruistic good of the others by initiating a charge on the armed guards. Some may hope to save their skins by exposing others to the authorities. Within such a camp the thousands of inmates might succeed in concerted action against the relatively few armed guards. It would depend upon the vulnerability of the watch towers, the security of the perimeter and the strength of arms. One might object that, with sufficient sacrifice, the inmates might resist and overcome the obstacles. Yet; achieving concertation remains a technical difficulty among the inmates when they are unable to organize explicitly. Implicit organization is possible, perhaps, based on contained subunit social organization such as dormitories, but exceedingly difficult with neither mechanisms nor arena of organization. In prisoner of war camps, by contrast to death camps, the existence of a recognized command structure, its disciplines and rules, frames organization. An extensive organization functions as a resource around which resistance can function more effectively, even if it is frequently outflanked by the force of superior arms and technology.

Organizational outflanking may operate on the basis of a knowledge of objective conditions whose existence renders resistant knowledge useless. One knows that one is an exploited wage earner but the routines of everyday living and life or the identity of one as a ‘man’ (or some other category meaningful for existence) have greater salience than ‘exploitation’. Freedom is defined by constraint. Free subjects have a necessity to ‘earn’ their living in dull compulsion, busy work, arduous exertion, ceaseless activity, routinely deadening, compulsory and invariable. Such techniques of power may easily discipline the most blithe of theoretically free spirits when the conditions of that freedom become evident. The most resistant of wills may bend when it realizes that it has no chance of increasing freedom to maneuver, through recourse to some alternative.

Time is double-edged here: both using the time of an agent on the routine performance of routine tasks, as well as the habituation that this produces over time as personal and intersubjective routines take on a ritual nature as bulwarks against the encroaching meaninglessness of externally imposed routine. Such rituals may be both informal and formal, the former a kind of resistance to the meaning of the latter, as Burawoy (1979) charts.

Formal rituals, myth and ceremony serve to reinforce and make meaningful the routines of everyday subordination just as resistance may seek to make these routines ironic or distant or to undercut them in some way. Thus, one endures the formal rituals of power.

Available Relevancy/Irrelevancy

Subjects seeking to build alliances with generalized others may have a story to tell. Reaching an audience potentially interested is another matter. Such subjects can enhance their resources considerably, if they know how to connect with media organizations, or know how to construct their story in such a way that it taps into the relevance of ‘news values’. But not if they are ignorant of what constitutes relevance. In the context of solidaristic organization under less framed knowledge, often there is a simple lack of awareness of the organizational agencies with whom one might construct an alliance. In terms of solidaristic organization one may, simply, be without ready access to potential allies. Though one might easily outweigh one's
protagonists if one could only connect with networks, one cannot because one cannot readily access them. Here resistance cannot be part of a concerted action. It remains unframed defiance, easily surmounted and overcome even when its irruption is not infrequent across the whole scope of power. Since the outbreaks remain uncoordinated, defeat, exile or incorporation threatens their survival.

One's experience of particular conditions in their emergence and state of becoming defines one's interests in overcoming or avoiding what one takes, at that time, their implications to be. Under such conditions, where one decides to avoid or overcome such implications, theoretically, one may be said to have an interest in not being subject to such interests as one conceives there to be. Such a conception of interest is phenomenologically valid rather than premised on the theoreticians' privilege that attaches to the discredited notion of 'real interests' (Haugaard, 1997a: 141). If we understand autonomy as a capacity for self-reflection, the maintenance of large bodies of knowledge as practical consciousness is inextricably bound up with the reproduction of certain relations of domination. Once an actor reflects upon his or her practical consciousness knowledge then he or she is realizing relative autonomy.

The social relations that constitute the expression of this relative autonomy make a considerable difference to it. Such relative autonomy is essentially discursive. Self-reflection can only take place through the medium of the categorization devices that members have available to them as part of the language games that they encounter with others, through others, in others, about others and selves alike and unlike their conceptions of their self. Hence, conceptions of interests form discursively: even to the extent that one can persuade some people that they have real but unrealized interests, the expression of which their present conditions of existence block. Such discursive realities shape their actions as resistance towards the sources of domination identified.

Conclusions

Neither resistance nor legitimacy is endemic, nor can they be taken for granted: for they occur through the discursive expressions of existing conditions of existence that are socially framed. Each depends on the relation of the practical consciousness of people through those categorical devices with which they lead their everyday lives, with the discursive consciousness that various media of representation proffer. As one would expect these media of representation to be extraordinarily plural and diverse in their concerns it will only be in rare moments that such diversity is represented or resisted in the name of some great unifying narrative or theme. Most probably these will be those relatively rare moments where a privileged identity is posited as a historical subject, such as moments of nationalism. In each case, to achieve the identity being posited requires capacities that overcome individual isolation, divisions between putative subjects, the knowledge that frames the practical consciousness of these putative subjects, and the objective conditions that sustain that knowledge.

The theorization of subjectivity in terms of moves between interpretative horizons means that the ability of actors to transcend their social environments and structured context does not presuppose an ability to ‘escape’ the processes of socialization by adopting a neutral, culturally unbiased, position. Subjective autonomy does not involve a flight into any transcendental realism of absolute truth, nor does it involve the transcending of ‘false’ consciousness. Critical faculty does not imply the objectivity of truth, nor does it entail an undersocialized concept of agency whereby autonomy is gained by transcending the basis of social culture. It requires only relative reflexivity on the part of subjects.

Other than through contingent individual actions, it is only access to organizational resources greater than those of the self that can overcome situations of stratified life-chances. It is the absence of these resources of social organization, or their ineffectiveness, which leads to resignation and acceptance.

The application of Foucault's work requires analysis of resistance, not merely as a vitalist principle but as a rationality of power sometimes used by those subject to power, where government fails to align their projects with those of the governing. Thus, government should not be considered some kind of functionalist device that renders resistance impossible. On the contrary: both the will to power and the will to resistance require failure as their warrant.
Notes

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1 Outside unreconstructed functionalist circles, few would dispute the advances unleashed by Foucauldian-influenced analyses such as those of Callon (1980; 1986; Callon and Latour, 1981; Callon and Law, 1982; Callon et al., 1986; 1983) and Laclau and Mouffe (Laclau, 1980; 1983a; 1983b; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 1987). These researchers made important contributions to organization analysis, that, with few exceptions (e.g., Law, 1996; McKinley and Starkey, 1998), have gone largely unremarked. Although Scott (1987) admits Foucault to the broad church of institutionalism's adolescence, this aspect of institutional theory has been somewhat neglected in organization theory.

2 In constructing knowledge/power relations as the object of analysis some of Foucault's critics, such as Perry Anderson (1983; also see 1985), insist that it is a relativism in which any fixed point dissolves.

3 Although a number of writers have written about Foucault's later work on power, with the exception of van Krieken (1996), they do not explicitly address organizational issues (Burchell, Gordon and Miller, 1991; Greco, 1993; Hindess, 1996; Hunter, 1993; Miller, 1994).

4 Foucault stressed intellectual experts: too narrowly, one thinks. One should include also more purposive forms of agency such as talk back radio announcers and popular journalists, agents with far more efficacy than most intellectuals. In Bauman's (1988) argument, in postmodernity the interpreters have overwhelmed the legislators.

5 Alternatively one might ask to what extent we, as subjects, find ourselves in the stories that these agencies construct.

- resistance
- poststructuralism
- prisoner of war camps
- legitimacy
- structuralism
- consciousness
- hegemony

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